An emotion regulation account of the paradox of fiction by Koroma, Matthieu
Running head : PARADOX OF FICTION : EMOTION REGULATION   1
An emotion regulation account of the paradox of fiction
Matthieu Koroma
LSCP, Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, PSL, Research University, 75005
Paris, France
PARADOX OF FICTION : EMOTION REGULATION ACCOUNT   2
Abstract
The paradox of fiction tackles how we can be considered as rational while having emotions towards
fictional and thus non-existing events. I aim to show that the different philosophical positions on 
this issue can be reconciled within the emotion regulation framework. This approach refines the 
concept of emotion, defining it as a sequence of distinct regulated processes. I argue that the 
philosophical solutions that have been proposed to solve the paradox can be framed as different 
regulation mechanisms occuring at each stage of the emotion sequence. Based on these results, I 
propose an original and unifying solution to the paradox of fiction which relies on the notion of 
quasi-belief. On one hand, this solution solves the paradox of fiction through rejecting each 
proposition of the paradox at different stages of the emotion process. On the other hand, it explains 
through the notion of rational appraisal why the question of the existence of emotions towards 
fictional events is bound to the question of their rationality. The functional roles of emotion towards
fictional events are thus discussed, showing how rationality shapes emotions towards fictional 
events.
Keywords: Paradox of fiction, Emotion, Metacognition, Emotion regulation, Quasi-belief
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1. Introduction
We do not passively attend to fiction. Rather we often empathize and develop physiological 
reactions and psychological attitudes towards fictional characters. These psychological and 
physiological phenomena, such as crying at one character's death, share similarities with regular 
emotions. Nevertheless people attending to fiction know that these events are fictional and their 
own reactions have no influence on the events of the fiction. Such tension between our beliefs and 
our reactions towards fiction has been characterized as irrational by Radford, leading to what is 
known as the paradox of fiction (Radford 1975). Following Radford's formulation of the problem, 
the paradox has been discussed in the form of an inconsistent triad of prima facie plausible claims: 
P1. We believe that fictional events are not real
P2. A necessary condition for an emotional response is a corresponding belief in the reality of the 
object of the emotional response
P3. We have genuine emotional reactions towards fictional events
To solve this paradox, philosophers have extensively focused on proving that one of the 
three propositons can be rejected, aiming to show that having emotions towards fiction while being 
rational is possible (the compatibility issue). Others have focused the discussion on characterizing 
the rationality of emotions towards fictional events (the rationality issue). 
In this article, I take a different approach. I rely on a psychological theory about emotion, the 
emotion regulation framework (Gross and Thompson, 2007), to tackle the paradox of fiction. While 
most philosophers have focused on explaining how emotions towards fictional events could be 
elicited, I argue that Radford’s original formulation of the paradox is more in line with an account in
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terms of emotion regulation. More specifically, I argue that solutions that have been proposed to 
solve the paradox can be described as different emotion regulation mechanisms. Importantly, these 
mechanisms occur at different stages of the emotion regulation process, rendering solutions to the 
paradox compatible and complementary to understand the regulation process of emotions directed 
towards fictional events. An original solution which unifies these solutions is proposed in the last 
part of this article. This solution solves the compatibility issue through denying each proposition of 
the paradox at the different stages of the emotion regulation process. To do so, it relies on the notion
of quasi-belief. A quasi-belief is a mental attitude embedded at a metacognitive level in a 
« validating frame », defining the condition of validity of the quasi-belief (Recanati 1997). During 
fiction, I propose that we hold the quasi-belief that : “fictional events are real” and a meta-belief 
that specifies that it is only inside this fiction that the content of the quasi-belief is true. Through 
quasi-belief, the evaluation of fictional events determining the emotion response is regulated 
through metacognitive control. This regulation is needed because the evaluation of fictional content 
at the rational level, called rational appraisal, can suppress the emotion response towards fictional 
events provided there is no rational justification for their existence, a regulation mechanism called 
emotion suppression. The emotion regulation framework explains thus why solving the 
compatibility issue, ie the existence of emotion towards fiction compatible with rationality, is 
intrinsically linked to the rationality issue, ie providing a justification for the presence of emotion 
towards fictional events. I will thus discuss the functional roles of emotion towards fictional events 
that provide rational ground for their rationality, shaping emotion processes towards fictional events
accordingly.
2. The emotion regulation framework
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The emotion regulation framework defines emotion as a regulation process. Three stages are
part of this process : the situation, the appraisal and the reponse (Barrett et al., 2007; Gross 1998, 
see figure 1). The situation refers to “the psychologically relevant situation, which is often external 
and hence physically specifiable” (Gross and Thompson, 2007). In the case of emotions towards 
fictional events, the situation consists in the fictional events depicted in a specific context. For 
example, it can be a monstrous character appearing on the screen in the movie theater or reading the
description of Anna Karenina’s misfortune while reading a novel. The fictional events happening in 
the situation are evaluated by the person attending to the movie or reading the book. This evaluation
of the situation is the second stage called appraisal. In a most general sense, appraisal theories are 
describing how interpretations of the emotional situations can explain emotion response (Ellsworth 
and Scherer, 2003). For exemple, seeing a bear in the wild and identifying some characteristics like 
its size and its aggressive attitude will shape the emotion reactions or emotion response. The 
emotion response, the third stage of the emotion process, involves “changes in experiential, 
behavioral, and physiological response systems” (Gross and Thompson, 2007), like a raise of heart 
rhythm or running away. Such emotion response takes part in defining the situation, as, for 
example, running away in front of a bear takes the dangerous situation and the trigger of the 
emotion away. The emotion process is thus a dynamic loop : each stage serves as a basis for the 
next stage (represented as arrows in figure 1). I will argue that emotions towards fictional events are
regulated at each stage of the emotion process. Solutions rejecting the different propositions of the 
paradox of fiction will be described in psychological terms as relating to distinct regulation 
mechanisms occuring at the different stages of the emotion regulation processes. Thus, my aim in 
this part is to show how these solutions are complementary in nature rather than competing since 
they refer to different aspects of the emotion regulation process. 
Insert Figure 1
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3. Solutions to the paradox as emotion regulation mechanisms applied at different stages
3.1. Regulating at the situation stage : changing our attitude towards fiction
I will first examine the possibility to solve the paradox of fiction through rejecting P1, ie the fact : 
P1. We believe that fictional events are not real
A logical analysis leads to distinguish two different ways to reject P1, either rejecting the content of 
the belief (P1’b) or having such a belief (P1’b).
P1’a. We believe that fictional events are real
P1’b. We do not believe that fictional events are not real
We can believe that fictional events are real insofar as we be caught up in a movie as we “forget that
Anna Karenina, Madame Bovary, Mercutio and so on are not real persons” (Radford 1975 :71, first 
solution). Our attitude to accept being caught up and treat fictional events or persons as real 
increases our propensity to be emotionally involved. This solution, that we believe that fictional 
events are real (P1’a), corresponds to situation selection, reflecting the process by which we “taking
actions that make it more (or less) likely that we will be in a situation we expect will give rise to 
desirable (or undesirable) emotions” (Gross and Thompson, 2007). The strength of this 
phenomenon called immersion finds evidence as the feelings directed towards a fictional character 
can persist even after the fiction has ended or even be transferred onto the real actor or actress that 
has played the role. This confusion between reality and fiction has been used by Radford to criticize
this position as it “turn(s) adults into children” (Radford 1975 :71). Another solution is thus 
explored that rather than believing that fictional events are real, we suspend our belief that during 
fiction, fictional events are not real.
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To prevent the belief that fictional events are not real, scenic dispositions discussed by Radford such
as “dim[ming] the lights and try[ing] to find good actors” (Radford 1975 :71, second solution) are 
used to reduce cues of fictionality such as the fact of being in a movie theater or that the action is 
staged. Such mechanism corresponds to situation modification, a regulation mechanism by which 
we make “active efforts to directly modify the situation so as to alter its emotional impact”. For 
example, “when a romantic interest comes over for dinner, [situation modification] may take the 
form of mood lighting, music, and the strategic excision of unflattering memorabilia” (Gross 1998).
This form of regulation being applied to the fictional situation is expressed in P1’b, that “we do not 
believe that fictional events are not real”, has been discussed by Radford as a form of willing 
suspension of disbelief (Radford 1975:72, second solution). The cognitive access to the belief that 
“fictional events are not real” is prevented, reflecting “the strategic excision of unflattering 
memorabilia” (Gross 1998) that could cause “the 'illusion (to be) shattered” (Radford 1975 :72). 
Neverthless, these solutions do not account for our emotion response because in both cases, they 
would predict that we treat fictional and real situations identically and as a matter of fact, “we do 
not try to get on the stage when, watching Romeo and Juliet, we see that Tybalt is going to kill 
Mercutio” (Radford 1975:71).
3.2. Regulation at the response stage : selecting the appropriate behavior
To overcome these issues raised by the rejection of P1, defenders of the simulation theory have 
proposed a particular way of believing relying on pretence. In this framework, two kind of beliefs 
are distinguished : a first class of beliefs is about the content of fictional events, a second class is 
about the description of these events are fictional. Distinguishing these two types of beliefs avoid to
confuse pretended beliefs and beliefs about reality (Shaper 1971). Based on this framework, 
simulation theorists have defended that “we are not in fact really moved by (fictional events) but 
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only behave emotionally as if we were”, explaining why we do not act towards fictional events in 
the same way as towards real events (Shaper, 1978 : 32). This notion has been most famously 
discussed by Walton, coining the term of quasi-emotions to describe emotions experienced during 
fiction that rely on pretended beliefs in a so-called game of make-believe (Walton, 1990). Such 
solution consists in the rejection of P3, ie :
P3. We have genuine emotional reactions towards fictional events
Two ways of denying P3 can be adopted, either denying that we have genuine emotions during 
fiction (P3’a), or denying that these are directed towards fictional events (P3’b). 
P3’a.  We do not have genuine emotional reactions towards fictional events
P3’b. We have emotional reactions towards real events
The idea that there is difference in our emotion response towards fictional events and real-life 
events has been first discussed by Radford (Radford 1985, sixth solution). He noticed that real-life 
and fictional emotions share similarities as concerning someone's death in reality and fiction, but 
points that in “retrospect, our behaviour differs” and “the anguish at [Mercutio’s] death is not 
perhaps as intense [as in the case of a real death]” (Radford 1975:77). This solution expressed in 
P3’a consists in a case of response modulation, a regulation mechanism that influences 
“physiological, experiential, or behavioral responses relatively directly” (Gross, 1998). One 
example is expressive suppression, which refers to “attempts to decrease ongoing emotion-
expressive behavior” (Gross and Thompson, 2007). Formulated with the terms of the emotion 
regulation framework, quasi-emotions are emotions which response is regulated differently than in 
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real-life, resulting in a different emotion response. Indeed, even if we are saddened by Mercutio's 
death, regulation at the response stage allows that we do not intervene on stage during
 Mercutio's death as it would be the case in real life, allowing the perfomance to carry on. 
Another solution is that emotions during fiction can be directed towards possible facts in 
reality evoked by the fictional events, and not fictional events as such. This solution has been 
described by Walton in following terms : “If Charles is a child, the movie may make him wonder 
whether there might not be real slimes or other exotic horrors like the one depicted in the movie, 
even if he fully realizes that the movie-slime itself is not real. Charles may well fear these suspected
dangers; he might have nightmares about them for days afterwards” (Walton 1990). This solution, 
expressed in P3’b, accounts for the elicitation of genuine emotions during fiction because emotions 
are there directed towards real events. Nevertheless this does not explain that emotions during the 
fictional experience are mainly directed precisely towards fictional events. As noted by Radford, 
when we pity Anna Karenina, “we weep for her [Anna Karenina]” and “not feel pity for her state or 
fate, or her history or her situation, or even for others, i.e., for real persons who might have or even 
have had such a history.” (Radford 1975 :75, fifth solution). A possibility remains that allows 
emotions to be elicited by real events and being directed towards fictional events. This 
phenomenon, known as misattribution of arousal, describes the situation where our physiological 
arousal is incorrectly interpreted according to the available context (Schachter and Singer, 1962). 
For exemple, the pity evoked by a relative sharing the fate of Anna Karenina could be directed 
towards Anna Karenina. Nevertheless, in the simulation theory, pretence is grounded on our ability 
to distinguish events belonging from the fictional context and events happening “in reality”. Thus 
misattribution of arousal is in contradiction with a fundamental asssumption of pretence and thus 
cannot be considered as a solution within the make-believe framework. A solution close to P3’b has 
been adopted by Currie with the “counterpart theory”, where events corresponding to the fictional 
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events in reality are triggering emotion towards fictonal events (Currie 1990). This solution rejects 
P2 and does not rely on the pretence framework. To show how this solution takes place in the 
emotion regulation framework, I will thus investigate the rejection of P2 corresponding to the 
appraisal stage in the emotion process. 
3.3. Regulation at the appraisal stage : interpreting fictional events
Säätelä used the existence of misattribution of arousal to argue that the make-believe framework 
was in fact unecessary to explain emotions in fiction (Säätelä, 1994). Indeed, arousing stimuli, like 
a picture of a snake, can automatically elicit an emotion response without relying on conscious 
evaluation (LeDoux 2000). Such evaluation does not depend on the veracity or the reality of the 
stimulus, since a stick of wood or mere pictures of a snake can be sufficient to trigger such activity 
(LeDoux 2000). Thu this solution of the paradox of fiction rejects P2, ie that :
P2. A necessary condition for an emotional response is a corresponding belief in the reality of the 
object of the emotional response
Four alternative ways of denying P2, either rejecting the necessity condition (P2a), that beliefs are 
required (P2b), that beliefs are about the reality of the object of the emotional response (P2c) or that
beliefs in the reality are about something else than the object of the emotion as such (P2d).
P2’a. A non-necessary condition for an emotion response is a corresponding belief in the reality of 
the object of the emotion response.
P2’b. A necessary condition for an emotion response is something else than a belief in the reality 
of the object of the emotion response.
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P2’c. A necessary condition for an emotion response is a corresponding belief in the possibility of 
the object of the emotion response.
P2’d. A necessary condition for an emotion response is a corresponding belief in the reality of 
something else than the object of the emotion response.
The first two solutions are in accordance with non-cognitive theories of emotions. Defenders of 
non-cognivist theories of emotions argue that emotion elicitation do not involve beliefs and rely 
either on an « affective » or an « embodied » appraisal (Robinson 2005 and Prinz 2004, 
respectively). Embodied emotions describe emotions as response mechanisms that have evolved or 
have been learned in relation to situations. For Robinson, beliefs can play a role in emotion not in 
their elicitation, but only in their regulation. These solutions denies P2 through denying P2’a, 
arguing that beliefs are non-necessary for emotion response. Nonetheless, beliefs can modify the 
emotion expression, for example, whenever the awareness that the snake towards which my fear is 
directed is actually a stick of wood can lead to a decrease of the emotion response (Robinson 2005, 
75–79). This case is an exemple of cognitive change, describing how belief update about the object 
emotion in the appraisal process can shape emotion response (Gross, 1998). Because fiction is a 
particular case of regulation for which the fact that events are not real is known a priori, this 
cognitive change should lead to the decrease of emotion towards fiction events. For exemple, 
emotion suppression describes how emotion reaction can be suppressed, as we will not run away if 
we see a stick of wood rather than a snake. If beliefs can alter emotion reaction as defended by 
Robinson, we should rationally display any or few emotion expression while reading a book or 
watching a movie since we know a priori that these events are merely fictional. Thus we are still 
left to explain why phenomena such as expression suppression are not happening when we have 
emotion expression towards fictional characters, compared “to other contexts where belief in the 
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reality of the suffering described or witnessed is necessary for the response” (Radford, 1975 : 72, 
third solution). One possibility is that such control is imperfect, and thus emotion response are 
incompletely regulated by rational appraisal. Neverthless, emotion response is in contradiction in 
this case with rationality and makes emotion in fiction a case of irrational behavior, and the 
compatibility issue is not solved.
Another solution is that emotions towards fictional characters do not rely on beliefs but simply 
mental representations (Lamarque 1981), thoughts (Carroll 1990), or imagination (Smith 1995). 
These positions correspond to P2’b, ie that a necessary condition for an emotion response is not a 
corresponding belief in the reality of the object of the emotion response.
The independence from belief can be explained in the frame of emotion regulation through 
distinguishing different levels of processing within the appraisal process. In a simple form, it is 
constituted of three components: a perceptual process, a memory based association process and a 
reasoning process (Smith and Kirby, 2000). At the perceptual and associative memory level, 
evaluation does not distinguish between real and imaginary stimuli (Kosslyn 2001). Such ability 
requires metacognition at the rational level, a process called reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 
1981). Thus, appraisal at these levels can trigger emotional reaction without involving beliefs and 
rationality. All three levels are usually being involved during emotion appraisal and thus we must 
account why rational appraisal in the fictional case does not cause downregulation of the emotion 
response towards fictional events.
A first possibility is to argue that the processing of an event like the appearance of a monster on 
screen is following a temporal sequence : first at the perceptual level, then at the memory-based 
associative level, and finally at the rational level. Thus, the emotion response would be triggered 
due to perceptual and memory-based associative processing before being downregulated by rational
appraisal. Nevertheless, emotions should be in these case very brief. Moreover, fiction is a 
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particular case of regulation since the fact that fictional events are not real is known before the 
appearance of the stimuli and thus rational appraisal could inhibit emotion expression before any 
perceptual and memory-based associative processes takes place. 
A second possibility is to consider that emotion response can be automatic such as in the case of a 
“startle reflex”, a process that triggers emotion reaction before any conscious appraisal of the 
situation, and thus difficult to downregulate. This possibility can apply for a fear episode following 
the sudden sight of monster on screen but can hardly account for complex emotions like feeling pity
while reading Anna Karenina that rely on complex and conscious appraisal (see Walton’s critique of
the “momentary-fear theory” for similar points (Walton, 1990)).
A third possibility is that the access for relevant information at the rational level is controlled during
the appraisal of fictional events. This mechanism of emotion regulation is called attention 
deployment, a process that selects relevant cues in the situation to be perceptually or cognitively 
processed. In the regulation framework, concentration allows “to draw attention to emotion 
triggers” (Gross, 1998). It explains how perceptual or memory-based associative appraisal can 
happen without triggering rational appraisal for the same stimulus. If concentration operates at the 
perceptual level, simply perceived or imagined events can trigger the emotion response. It would 
nevertheless lead to ignore the fictionality of events because the rational appraisal is not accessed. 
This is in contradiction with the acceptance of P1 by such solutions and the fact that we believe that
fictional events are not real. If concentration targets memory-based association processes, the 
emotion response will be shaped by memories of events evoked by the fictional event, for example 
by the thought of a relative having a similar fate as Anna Karenina. Nonetheless, concentration on 
exclusively memory-based association processes is in contradiction with the acceptance of P3, ie 
that our emotion are directed towards fictional events as such and not towards real events. Indeed, 
the appraisal will be focused on the available evidence being the thought of the real situation 
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evoked by the fictional events and thus the object of emotion will be these real events. 
Still, a possible solution would be a situation of misattribution of arousal where concentration 
would occur at both perceptual and memory-based associative level without involving the rational 
level. Emotion would be directed towards fictional events while being elicited by real events. Since 
this solution does not endorse make-believe, such misattribution of arousal would not be in 
contradiction with other theoretical commitments. Nevertheless, emotions based on misattribution 
of arousal fail to be rational because the emotion response is unfitting compared to its object, since 
it is elicited by real events which are not the object of the emotion. The inadequacy between 
emotion response and their object is described as a first way through which emotions can be 
considered as irrational according to d’Arms and Jacobson (d’Arms & Jacobson, 2000). Positions 
that defend that beliefs are not necessary for the elicitation of emotion and do not rely on 
misattribution of arousal have been shown to be in contradiction with either P1 or P3, and thus fail 
to be rational as well. Hence, these solutions do not solve the compatibility issue because such 
emotions fail to be rational since they are either in contradiction with other propositions of the 
paradox or because they rely on misattribution of arousal.
There is other solutions that reject P2 while preserving rational appraisal. The last two solutions 
denying P2 are stating that what is required for an emotion response is a belief in the possibility of 
the object of the emotion response (P3’c) or in the reality of something else than the object of the 
emotion response (P3’d). These two solutions are preserving rational appraisal because they rely on 
beliefs. They are akin to the positions defended respectively by Lamarque to who the belief in the 
“mere possibility” of a fictional event is a necessary condition (Lamarque 1981) and by Currie to 
who the belief in a real event corresponding to the fictional event which is the object of the emotion
is necessary (Currie 1990). Nevertheless, they do not provide justification why at the rational level, 
the possibility of fictional events or the existence of their counterpart in reality is a valid 
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justification for emotion towards fictional events. This question is crucial because emotion 
regulation is primarily expected to suppress the emotion response towards fictional events since our 
reactions do not affect the fictional plot. The lack of justification and rational ground for an emotion
reponse is the second way through which emotions can be considered as irrational according to 
d’Arms and Jacobson (d’Arms & Jacobson, 2000). Because these solutions focus on emotion 
elicitation but not on the possibility of emotion regulation, they do not address the fact that 
expression suppression by rational appraisal is not always occuring during fiction can occur should 
be accounted for. In this case, solving the compatibility issue necessitates to solve the rationality 
issue. 
Overall, all solutions describe some regulation mechanism occuring during fiction but are not 
successful to solve the paradox of fiction in isolation (see table 1). My aim will be in the last part to 
offer a synthetic solution to the paradox which accounts for the different regulation mechanisms 
described at each stage, and to detail the functional roles of emotions in fiction interpreted within 
the emotion regulation framework, justifying the presence of emotions and shaping emotion 
processes accordingly.
Insert table 1
4. Solving the paradox of fiction through integrating emotion regulation mechanisms
4.1 Quasi-belief as a synthetic solution for the compatibility issue
To provide a unifying solution to the paradox of fiction, I propose to apply the notion of quasi-belief
to our attitude regarding fiction. This notion was introduced to solve the problem of apparently 
irrational beliefs (Sperber 1985). An example of apparently irrational belief is the Holy Trinity, 
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which describes a unique God as three persons (Sperber 1997). The belief that “fictional events are 
real” is also irrational because fictional events are by definition not real. A quasi-belief can be 
described a proposition embedded in a “validating frame”, defining the condition of its validity, 
characterized by a meta-belief (Recanati 1997). For exemple, the meta-belief that Holy Trinity is a 
divine miracle serves as an embedding belief for the belief in the Holy Trinity. I propose that during
fiction, we have the quasi-belief that “fictional events are real”, and a meta-belief that defines the 
frame which limits the validity of this quasi-belief inside the fictional world. 
First, quasi-belief accounts for the situation selection mechanism through which we develop 
a particular mental attitude towards fiction. This attitude is the quasi-belief that “(within fiction), 
fictional events are real” (P1’a). This requires nonetheless the suspension of the disbelief 
represented by the meta-belief that supports the distinction between beliefs within and outside the 
fiction. The context of an experience of a fiction involves most of the time percepts that belong to 
“outside”of fiction such as other people watching the play in a theater. The maintenance of the 
quasi-belief is in this situation unstable because such cues grab our attention and trigger the 
activation of the meta-belief that it is only within fiction that these events are real. Thus, in a movie 
theater, we “dim the lights” and recruit “good actors” to allow the maintenance of the quasi-belief in
the reality of fictional events (P1’b) and allow emotion response to happen. Contrary to Radford’s 
claim this turns “adults into children”, we still possess the meta-belief that fictional events are true 
only within fiction. Such knowledge can be used whenever we are asked for exemple if we believe 
in the fiction or our emotions need to be regulated accordingly, for exemple to avoid getting on 
stage during a play or running away from the cinema theater. 
How beliefs about fictional events and meta-beliefs interact to modulate the emotional 
response has been discussed with the notion of bracketing (Todd 2012). Through the voluntary 
engagement in fiction, emotions can be elicited by attending selectively to the fictional events. The 
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meta-belief defining the fictionality of the experience can nonetheless be “bracketed” during the 
cognitive evaluation and allows us to focus “our attention to our own epistemic relationship 
to [fictional events]” (Todd 2012). This mechanism is accounted for in the emotion regulation 
framework by attentional deployment. The mechanism of concentration allows to immerse 
ourselves in fiction while being able to modulate our behavior through rational regulation. If 
emotion needs to be regulated, for exemple to avoid getting on stage and disturbing the play, the 
meta-belief will be accessed through attention and this will trigger the rational appraisal (P2’a). For 
exemple, if Charles perceives a slime during a movie, the emotion response will be generated based 
on perceptual and memory-based appraisal and the quasi-belief that “there is a dangerous slime” 
(P2’b). The meaning of the quasi-belief will be framed as “(within this fiction), there is dangerous 
slime” at the rational level. This will lead to redefine the quasi-belief into a full-fledged belief 
through cognitive change, by which the meaning of the object of emotion is changed into “this is a 
fictional slime”. The belief in the possibility of fictional events (P2’c) or in the reality of 
corresponding events related to the fictional events (P2’d) can then serve as justification of the 
presence of the emotion (see 4.3 for a discussion of those points and the rationality issue). At the 
response stage, this mechanism leads to alter the emotion behavior through changing respectively 
either the emotion response (P3’a) or the object (P3’b). In the first case, this account is akin to 
solutions rejecting P3 like “quasi-emotions” because emotions are regulated based on different 
types of belief at a rational level, ie the belief that fictional events are possible events, which lead to
a different emotion response that emotions directed towards real-life events. For example, we will 
not try to intervene on stage because the justification for the emotion is grounded on the rational 
appraised of the mere possibility of its object. In the second case, the emotion response is directed 
towards real-events and justified on the basis that it evokes real-life events, and thus the fictional 
events are not addressed by the emotion response, and we will not try intervene on stage 
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accordingly. 
To sum up, the emotion regulation framework offers a dynamic view on the resolution to the 
paradox of fiction. At the situation stage, P1 is rejected because we do not believe that fictional 
events are not real, but rather have a quasi-belief that fictional events are real and a meta-belief that 
this is valid only within fiction. At the appraisal stage, we are using concentration to develop our 
emotion reaction and the rational appraisal contextualises our emotion and calls for different ways 
of rational appraisal. At the response stage, P3 is rejected because the regulation of the emotion 
response by rational appraisal fundamentally changes the emotion response, either through 
changing the response itself or the object of the emotion. 
4.2. Evidence in the favor of the emotion regulation framework
The emotion regulation framework for emotion towards fictional events has found recent empirical 
support (Sperduti et al., 2016). While people were viewing short movies labelled randomly either as
“real” or “fictional”, the intensity of their emotion response was recorded through measuring the 
galvanic skin response and collecting subjective reports of the intensity of the emotion. While 
similar levels of physiological reaction are observed for both situations, “fictional” movies were 
judged subjectively to be less intense and this reduction was less severe if fictional movies were 
considered personally relevant (Sperduti et al, 2016). This suggests that for the same stimuli, 
emotion towards fictional and real events share similarities, notably in the automatic emotion 
response, but can be regulated at the subjective level in a graded way according to the “personal 
relevance” of fictional events for real life. These results have been interpreted as relying on the 
mecanism of cognitive reappraisal, involving “changes emotion’s meaning in a way to alter its 
emotional impact” (Gross and Thompson, 2007). As such, personal relevance could have changed 
either the object of the emotion or the appraisal of the possibility of the fictional events, leading to 
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up-regulation of the subjective component of the response. To investigate this question in further 
details, I tackle the rationality issue to demonstrate how the possibility of fictional events can serve 
as rational basis and shapes emotion response towards fictional events. Indeed, emotion regulation 
allows to solve the compatibility issue thanks to the flexibility of our metacognitive processes but 
calls for a solution of the rationality issue to justifiy that the possibility of fictional events or the 
reaction towards real events evoked linked to rational appraisal are shaping emotion response 
according to their functional roles in both situations and render emotion expression fitting to their 
object. 
4.3. Emotion regulation and the rationality issue
To be rational, emotions must satistisfy two senses of rationality (d’Arms & Jacobson, 2000). On 
one hand, emotions towards fictional events are rational if the emotional expression is “appropriate”
to the content of fictional events. On the other hand, emotions in fiction are rational if they have a 
functional role that justify their presence. 
Based on perceptual and memory appraisal, emotions are most often appropriate to their content, as 
we cry for Mercutio’s Death or our blood pressure rises while watching a horror movie. 
Neverthless, some discrepancy can occur when for exemple due to bad acting in a B-movie, stimuli 
that should trigger fear actually cause laughter. I argue that in these cases, the fictional nature of the 
situation cannot be ignored through willing suspension of disbelief because cues linked to bad 
acting indicating its fictional nature are activating the meta-belief. In these cases, rational appraisal 
changes the meaning of emotions and they are not directed towards the fictional content, but rather 
the fictional experience per se and its associated expectations. 
In this sense, fiction can offer experience emotions that can be informative about the functioning of 
our own cognitive mechanisms. Let’s take the example of a viewer who is claustrophobic but had 
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never been in such an eliciting situation before. If she watches a movie involving a spelunking 
expedition and becomes anxious, she can learn that she is prone to this type of emotion reaction. 
Moreover, she can learn this in a safe environment without direct risk for her. Her knowledge of the 
fictionality of this event allows her to regulate rationally her emotional response accordingly. 
Through exercising our metacognitive abilities, we can get reflexively a knowledge about our own 
reactions to events and we can regulate these reactions without the same constraints of the 
equivalent situation in reality. Hence, the belief in the possibility of fictional events is a justification
for developping an emotion response because it allows us to explore our own mental process and 
reactions without real-life risks. This functional role shapes through rational appraisal how the 
emotion response will be displayed. Indeed, fiction is a situation where the feeling is informative 
about our own processes but do not directly serves acting in the world, a function of emotion 
proposed as the “feeling as information” theory by Clore (Clore 1992). In fiction, the value of 
emotions is thus not be evaluated based on their consequences as actions but rather according to 
their informational value. Followingly, it predicts that the types of emotion response should involve 
more components directly involved in the feeling such as experiential and physiological changes 
rather than motor actions.
If the emotion is directed towards real events evoked by the fictional events, cognitive value can be 
found in the fictional experience because attending to fiction can help the understanding of the 
situation evoked by the fictional events. Hence, the situation of a relative who shares the fate of 
Anna Karenina can through the fictional experience be better understood. Relying on emotion 
regulation, fiction is an occasion to exercise and understand our own cognitive processes and real-
life situations with different constraints that real-life events, which provides cognitive value and 
justification for the presence of emotion in fiction.
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5. Conclusion
A conceptual analysis of the paradox of fiction explored how solutions proposed in the literature 
can be cast as different emotion regulation mechanisms occurring at each stage of the emotion 
sequence. All these mechanisms play a role in the possibility to experience emotion in the fiction, 
justifying the presence of several solutions to the paradox of fiction. Crucially, emotion regulation 
naturally links the compatibility issue to the rationality issue through the notion of rational 
appraisal. The distinction between the different levels of appraisal allows the complexity and 
flexibility of emotion regulation in the fictional context. To provide a simple and comprehensive 
account of how this regulation, I show how the notion of quasi-belief can solve the paradox of 
fiction in a dynamic manner, rejecting each proposition at different stages of the emotion process. 
This solution, contrary to previous solutions, highlights the cognitive flexibility offered by 
metacognitive skills which underpin the regulation of emotion response towards fictional events. 
This offers a picture of the emotion regulation operating in fictional situation and how it shapes the 
emotion process in a fundamentally different manner between fictional and real-life situations, 
leading to different emotion responses fulfilling different functional roles in fiction. The emotion 
regulation account details as such the specificity of emotions that we have towards fictional events.
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Figure 1. The emotion regulation framework and its relationship to the proposition of the paradox 
of fiction. On the bottom part, the different emotion regulation mechanisms and their 
correspondences to the stages of the modal model of emotions are added. Adapted from Gross & 
Thompson (2007)
















Solution 1 P1’a Illusion theory







perception Solution 4 P2’b Thought theory
memory Solution 5 P3’d Counterpart theory




Response Response modulation expression Solution 6 P3’a  Simulation theory
Table  1.  The  paradox  of  emotion  in  the  emotion  regulation  framework.  On  the  left  side,  the
correspondence between the modal model of emotion and emotion regulation are shown, as well as
their relation to the cognitive and behavioral components of emotions (see Gross & Thompson 2007
for a review). They are mirrored in the different solutions discussed by Radford and the logical
refutation of each different proposition of the paradox of fiction. As discussed, we reframed the
denial of P3b as a case of cognitive appraisal at the memory and rational level.
